Governance, Upgrades, and Forks BDC Practice Questions (Page 1)

Questions 1–5

1. 1expert · hard

   A blockchain network is considering a governance change that would give token holders the power to veto any protocol upgrade. However, this could slow down the upgrade process and make the network less competitive. What is the best way to balance these concerns?

   • AImplement a veto mechanism with a high quorum requirement and a time limit for voting
   • BAllow token holders to veto but only after the upgrade is already activated
   • CGive token holders veto power but allow developers to override it
   • DRemove the veto mechanism and let developers decide all upgrades
   Reveal Solution Discussion Select an answer first
2. 2foundation · easy

   What is the primary mechanism by which nodes coordinate to resolve a chain split after a fork?

   • ANodes wait for a central authority to declare the correct chain.
   • BNodes randomly select a chain and stick with it permanently.
   • CNodes follow the longest valid chain according to their consensus rules.
   • DNodes always choose the chain with the highest block reward.
   Reveal Solution Discussion Select an answer first
4. 3foundation · easy

   Which of the following is a recognized trade-off of on-chain governance compared to off-chain governance?

   • AOn-chain governance is completely immune to centralization because all votes are recorded publicly.
   • BOn-chain governance provides a clear audit trail of decisions but may be vulnerable to low voter participation or concentration of voting power.
   • COff-chain governance is always more secure because it avoids smart contract bugs in voting systems.
   • DOn-chain governance eliminates the need for community discussion because voting is automated.
   Reveal Solution Discussion Select an answer first
5. 4expert · hard

   A blockchain network uses a delegated proof-of-stake (DPoS) governance model where token holders vote for a small number of block producers. A group of large token holders colludes to elect block producers who will approve a controversial upgrade that benefits them. What is the most effective way to mitigate this governance risk?

   • AIncrease the number of block producers to reduce the influence of any single colluding group
   • BMove to a proof-of-work consensus to avoid governance issues
   • CImplement a mechanism for token holders to recall and replace block producers at any time
   • DRequire a supermajority vote (e.g., 75%) for any upgrade
   Reveal Solution Discussion Select an answer first
6. 5expert · hard

   A blockchain network is experiencing a chain split after a contentious hard fork. Both chains have significant hash power and community support. A developer proposes a 'reconciliation' mechanism that would allow the two chains to merge back into one. What is the most likely outcome of this proposal?

   • AThe proposal will succeed if miners switch to the other chain
   • BThe proposal will succeed if both communities agree to use the same consensus rules
   • CThe proposal will succeed if the two chains share the same genesis block
   • DThe proposal is technically infeasible because the two chains have different consensus rules and histories
   Reveal Solution Discussion Select an answer first