Proof of Stake (PoS) and Derivative Protocols BDC Practice Questions (Page 7)

Questions 31–35

1. 31application · medium

   A user on an LPoS network leases their tokens to a forging node. The node behaves maliciously and is penalized. What is the impact on the user's leased tokens?

   • AThe user's tokens are unaffected because the node is the one that misbehaved.
   • BThe user's tokens are transferred to the node operator as compensation.
   • CThe user's tokens are returned immediately and the lease is cancelled.
   • DThe user's leased tokens are also slashed because they were part of the node's effective stake.
   Reveal Solution Discussion Select an answer first
2. 32application · medium

   A Proof of Stake network needs to implement a protocol upgrade that changes the block reward distribution. The governance model uses on-chain voting where token holders vote proportionally to their stake. What is the most likely outcome if a small group of large stakeholders controls over 60% of the voting power?

   • AThe upgrade will be decided by a random selection of token holders
   • BThe upgrade will be implemented only if the core developers approve it
   • CThe upgrade will fail because all token holders must agree unanimously
   • DThe upgrade will pass if the large stakeholders vote in favor, potentially overriding smaller holders
   Reveal Solution Discussion Select an answer first
4. 33application · medium

   A user leases 1000 tokens to a forging node in a Leased Proof of Stake network. The node forges a block and receives a reward. How is the reward typically distributed?

   • AThe node keeps a commission and distributes the remainder proportionally to all leasers
   • BThe reward is burned to reduce inflation
   • CThe user receives the full reward because they provided the stake
   • DThe reward is split equally among all token holders in the network
   Reveal Solution Discussion Select an answer first
5. 34application · medium

   A startup is launching a permissioned blockchain for inter-bank settlements. They want to avoid the energy costs of Proof of Work and need fast finality. They plan to use a Proof of Stake model where the founding banks are the only validators. Which additional design choice is most important to prevent a single bank from controlling block production?

   • AUse a round-robin schedule where each bank produces blocks in a fixed order regardless of stake.
   • BAllow any bank to become a validator without a minimum stake, but rely on a reputation score from the other banks.
   • CRequire validators to lock a minimum stake and rotate the block proposer selection randomly, weighted by stake.
   • DSet the block reward to zero and rely on transaction fees to incentivize validators.
   Reveal Solution Discussion Select an answer first
6. 35foundation · easy

   What is a common trade-off of Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS) compared to standard Proof of Stake?

   • AHigher transaction throughput but increased centralization risk due to a limited number of delegates
   • BGreater decentralization but lower security
   • CLower energy consumption but slower block times
   • DSimpler codebase but higher hardware requirements
   Reveal Solution Discussion Select an answer first